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This paper  proposes  a  theory  of  how  employee-driven  innovations  are  developed.  An
employee  with  private  information  about  the  value  of  his  idea  can create  a spin-out,  work
in a division  of  the  parent  ﬁrm,  or work  for a  spinoff  of  the  parent  ﬁrm.  Developing  an  idea in
a spinoff  allows  the  parent  ﬁrm  to offer  a performance-based  contract,  which  mitigates  the
adverse selection  problem  but  also decreases  the  ﬁrm’s  incentives  to  invest  in the  project.
Therefore,  inefﬁcient  spin-outs  are  driven by  the  informational  asymmetry  and  the  endoge-
nous investment  of  the  parent  ﬁrm.  The  characteristics  of  the  innovation,  the  employee’s
managerial  talent,  and  the ﬁrm’s  performance  in  its  core  activity  affect  the  likelihood  a
spin-out  is  created.  The  implementation  of  employees’  ideas  in  turn affects  the innovation
process.  Ideas  with  a lower  probability  of being  good  are  more  likely  to  be  explored  by  an
employee  within  the  ﬁrm  than  by  an outsider.
© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
1. Introduction
Generating and developing new ideas are important drivers of economic growth. New ideas can emerge in different ways,
but many are created by employees within existing ﬁrms. The aim of this paper is to propose a theory of how these ideas are
developed and analyze how the development decision is related to the characteristics of the industry, of the parent ﬁrm, and
of the innovation. The modalities of new idea’s development affect the agents’ incentives to innovate. The paper analyzes
these incentives and characterizes the different proﬁles of innovation initiated within and outside existing corporations.
An employee with an idea can leave the ﬁrm and develop the idea in a new independent venture (spin-out). The evidence
suggests that many of the new ideas implemented in new ventures were generated while the employee worked for a parent
ﬁrm in the same industry. Bhide (1994) highlights that ‘71% of all founders had replicated or modiﬁed an idea encountered
1
Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license. through  previous employment’. Gompers et al. (2005) ﬁnd that 45% of all venture capital-backed startups are spawned
by public companies. However, a considerable part of innovative activity occurs within corporations. The parent ﬁrm’s
involvement in developing the ideas may  take different forms,2 some of the ideas are developed internally while others are
spun off and implemented in ﬁrm’s subsidiaries.3 This raises the following questions: What determines if an idea will be
∗ Tel.: +44 02078823996.
E-mail address: r.nikolowa@qmul.ac.uk
1 The sample: 100 founders of the 1989 Inc 500 fastest-growing private companies.
2 An example of such involvement are the corporate venturing programs. Those programs ﬁnance external or internal projects. In the latter case, the
program’s  aim was  to allow the employees to develop their innovations while relying on the company for ﬁnancial, legal and marketing support.
3 In the ﬁnance literature, a spinoff is created when a public company distributes its equity ownership in a subsidiary to its shareholders, the parent
shareholders receive a subsidiary stock in proportion to their ownership in the parent ﬁrm. In the model, the term spinoff is used in a broader sense.
0167-2681     ©  2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.001
Open access under CC BY-NC-SA license. 
i
s
i
i
i
t
a
a
e
d
p
n
p
a
t
t
a
I
g
T
c
w
n
t
s
i
e
t
i
o
w
a
(
a
H
c
i
s
i
o
w
l
b
K
i
i
a
t
a
s
a
wR. Nikolowa / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 98 (2014) 70– 88 71
mplemented internally or in a spinoff? Is the possibility for the ﬁrm to create subsidiaries enough to prevent inefﬁcient
pin-out creations? Understanding the path of idea development within ﬁrms allows us to understand what differentiates
t from the possibilities offered to innovations initiated outside the ﬁrm. This raises a new question, what are the differences
n the portfolios of innovative ideas explored within and outside the ﬁrm?
To address these questions, I proceed in two steps. First, I analyze the stage of idea implementation of employee-driven
nnovations related to the parent ﬁrm’s capability. Second, I compare the incentives to innovate for agents within and outside
he ﬁrm and discuss differences in patterns of innovation.
Employees come up with innovative ideas: a new technology, a new production process, or a new product. Since the
nalysis is about employee-driven innovations, I assume (i) that the employee has better knowledge than anybody else
bout the value of his innovation and (ii) that he is critical for the implementation of the idea. For each employee, the parent
mployer decides whether to keep him or not, and if the employee is retained whether to let him develop his idea (in a
ivision or in a spinoff) or allocate him to the ﬁrm’s core activity. In the latter case, the project is not implemented. The
arent ﬁrm can contribute to the performance of the new idea by allocating resources to it. The allocation of resources to a
ew idea has an opportunity cost, and the amount to be allocated depends on the corporation’s share in the new idea.
If the idea is developed in a division of the ﬁrm, then the idea’s performance cannot be disentangled from the overall
erformance of the corporation. The employer can offer only a ﬁxed wage contract to an employee. In this case, the ﬁrm is
 residual claimant of the idea’s proﬁts and therefore has strong incentives to invest in the new activity. The downside is
hat since the employee’s reward is not based on performance, the information asymmetry problem is very strong. Indeed,
o prevent an employee with a bad idea from pretending he has a good one, the employer must offer him the same reward
s to an employee with a good idea.
Alternatively, the parent ﬁrm may  allow an employee with a good idea to develop it in a spinoff (subsidiary of the ﬁrm).
n this case, the ﬁrm can offer a performance-based contract to mitigate the information asymmetry problem. However,
iving up a share of the cash ﬂows to the employee reduces the ﬁrm’s share and therefore the ﬁrm’s incentives to invest.
his limits the share that can be offered to the employee and therefore the extent to which the adverse selection problem
an be mitigated. The decision to develop an idea internally or in a spinoff trades off the rent extraction of the employees
ith bad ideas with the efﬁcient investment by the parent ﬁrm.
Due to the information asymmetry, keeping employees with good ideas in a division or in a spinoff comes at a cost,
amely, increased wages for employees with bad ideas. Therefore, when the probability that an idea is good is low or when
he rent left to agents with bad ideas is high, the employer lets employees with good ideas leave the ﬁrm and create inefﬁcient
pin-outs. The spin-outs implement good ideas by founders whose ability is lower than the ability of those who develop
deas in the parent ﬁrm’s subsidiaries.
The consequence of the internal idea implementation process is that in case an employee comes up with a bad idea his
xpected payoff is higher than the expected payoff of an agent who comes up with a bad idea outside the ﬁrm. Therefore,
he incentives to innovate within and outside the ﬁrm are different, which affects the characteristics of the pool of available
deas. The pool of internal innovations includes ideas with a lower likelihood of being good and a higher risk than the pool
f outside innovations does.
Spin-out creation has attracted a substantial attention in terms of theoretical and empirical analysis. In what follows, I
ill discuss the contribution of the paper to the existing theories, the empirical evidence and how my  results relate to it
re discussed in the paper. One strand of the theoretical literature explains employees’ departures as efﬁcient outcomes
Pakes and Nitzan, 1983; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Cassiman and Ueda, 2006 among others). In these papers, spin-outs
rise because the idea is less valuable if it is developed by the parent employer than in an independent new venture.
A second strand, which this paper is more closely related to, aims to explain the existence of inefﬁcient spin-outs.
ellmann (2007) shows that when employees face a multitasking problem – work on the ﬁrm’s core activity or innovate,
ommitting ex ante not to develop employees’ ideas and allow them to leave the ﬁrm ex post, reduces the incentives to
nnovate and increases the employee’s effort in the core activity. In the present paper, the mechanism driving inefﬁcient
pin-outs is a mix  of adverse selection between the employee and the parent ﬁrm and the need to motivate the ﬁrm to invest
n the project. Similar to Hellmann, I also consider the employee’s incentives to innovate. However, the focus of my paper is
n the resulting different proﬁles of innovation initiated within the ﬁrm and innovation initiated outside the ﬁrm.
Amador and Landier (2003) study the implementation of employees’ ideas within corporations or by venture capitalists
hen the entrepreneurs are overly optimistic about the quality of their ideas. The trade-off is between an exogenously set
ower implementation cost if the idea is developed internally (by the parent employer), but also reduced contractual ﬂexi-
ility due to the impossibility to write a performance-based contract when the company ﬁnances the new project. Hvide and
ristiansen (2012) and Gambardell and Panico (2009) consider better informed researchers and some advantage from work-
ng with the parent ﬁrm. Hvide and Kristiansen (2012) consider a trade-off between increased outcome due to complementar-
ties when the idea is developed internally and impossibility to write performance-based contracts in that case. Gambardell
nd Panico (2009) consider that the principal can use the delegation of decision-making authority in order to provide incen-
ives to the privately informed researcher. My  paper shows that in a setting where the parent ﬁrm’s investment is endogenous,
llowing the parent employer to write performance-based contracts (by allowing him to develop the employee’s idea in a
ubsidiary) does not prevent the existence of spin-outs. Also, differently from Hvide and Kristiansen (2012) and Gambardell
nd Panico (2009), I show that the quality of the ideas developed in spin-outs depends on the degree of ﬁt of the new idea
ith the activity of the parent ﬁrm. As the degree of ﬁt decreases the quality of the ideas implemented in spin-outs increases.
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Chatterjee and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) consider a setting in which workers have better information about their own  ideas.
An idea can either be sold to an entrepreneur or spun out and developed by the worker in a new independent venture. Thus,
the mechanism driving the spin-outs is the adverse selection problem in the market for ideas. The authors also characterize
the entry and growth process of ﬁrms, as well as the ﬁrm-size distribution. In my  paper, I allow the parent employer to offer
performance-based contracts to the employee by introducing the possibility of developing the new idea in a subsidiary of
the parent ﬁrm. In a setting with exogenous synergy, adverse selection only drives spin-out creation as far as the principal
does not have the possibility of writing a contract based on the innovation’s outcome. Therefore, I show that the driver of
spin-outs is the information asymmetry and the endogenous investment by the parent employer.
Anton and Yao (1995) study the problem of an employee who privately observes an idea and may  either reveal it to the
ﬁrm or develop it in a spin-out, which directly competes with the incumbent ﬁrm.4 The rationale for spin-outs is due to
the possibility that the ﬁrm might steal the idea and develop it on its own, without the employee. Thus, spin-outs will be
prevented if the gains from avoiding competition for the incumbent ﬁrm are sufﬁciently high. In this paper, inefﬁcient spin-
outs are driven by the combination of adverse selection5 and the endogenous investment by the parent ﬁrm. In addition,
the present paper allows us to explain the driving forces of idea implementation in a division of the ﬁrm or in a subsidiary.
Differently from Anton and Yao (1995), Amador and Landier (2003), Gambardell and Panico (2009), Chatterjee and Rossi-
Hansberg (2012), and Hvide and Kristiansen (2012), I also discuss the talent allocation problem that an employer deals with
and show that the most talented employees develop their ideas internally, while the less talented ones leave and create
spin-outs. Finally, my  paper offers some implications in terms of the innovation proﬁles within and outside the ﬁrm.
The paper is also related to other work that analyzes the incentives to innovate. Anand and Galetovic (2000), for example,
study how the possibility of an agent walking away with an idea affects corporations’ and venture capitalists’ incentives
to invest in R&D. de Bettignies and Chemla (2008) consider a model of competition for talent between a venture capitalist
and an established company. They show that the competition for talent fosters corporate venturing. The perspective of this
paper is different, since I focus on the employee’s incentives to innovate and on the consequences in terms of characteristics
of the ideas explored within and outside the ﬁrm. Manso (2011) shows that the optimal contract that would motivate
employees to engage in exploratory activities should be tolerant of failure. Similarly to Manso (2011), the reason for which
employees are more likely to explore a new opportunity internally is the higher expected reward for employees with bad
ideas. The difference is that rather than resulting from an incentive scheme designed by the ﬁrm, stronger incentives are the
consequence of the internal implementation process of new ideas.
Finally, the paper also contributes to the literature aiming to explain the empirically documented positive stock price
reaction around the announcement of a spinoff.6 Aron (1991) argues that spinning-off an activity allows us to tie a manager’s
performance to the market valuation for that activity. Thus, the possibility of a spinoff increases the manager’s incentives
even if the spinoff rarely occurs. Nanda and Narayanan (1999) show that when there are information asymmetries about the
value of the ﬁrm, between the ﬁrm and the investors, undervalued ﬁrms would spin off an activity in order to increase their
market value before raising capital. In the present paper, developing an idea in a spinoff mitigates the internal information
asymmetry and, differently from the previous articles, translates into increased efﬁciency of the core activity of the ﬁrm.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 discusses the optimal allocation of
an employee with a good idea, shows that inefﬁcient spin-outs may  be created in equilibrium, and links the likelihood of
creation and survival of spin-outs to the performance of the parent ﬁrm. Section 4 offers an extension of the model, it is
considered that ideas can be of more than two types. Then, Section 5 discusses the differences between innovations initiated
within and outside the ﬁrm. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Model
2.1. Framework
A ﬁrm employs agents in a production activity (core activity hereafter) requiring some managerial ability. An employee’s
managerial ability is denoted as  ( ≤ 1), and the expected surplus from an employee with ability  working in the core
activity is b. b is the exogenous return to talent in the core activity of the ﬁrm, can be affected by changes in the degree of
competition, and evolves over the life-cycle of a product or activity.
At the beginning of the period of interest, a continuum of employees with mass one have innovative ideas (projects). A
successfully implemented idea generates cash ﬂow ˇ. The cash ﬂow in the case of success can be high (good idea)  ˇ with
probability q, or low (bad idea)  ˇ with probability (1 − q). The outcome when the idea implementation fails is zero. Whether
4 The vocabulary used in this paper differs from the one in Anton and Yao (1995), in their article: the employee can develop the idea independently in a
start-up, with the parent ﬁrm in a spin-off, or the parent ﬁrm can implement an alternative internal idea rather than the idea of the employee.
5 It is implicitly assumed that the employee can manipulate the information and therefore cannot credibly communicate the value of his idea to the
parent ﬁrm. Then, the case where the employee develops his idea in a division of the ﬁrm could be interpreted as him selling the property rights to the
parent  employer in a strong property rights setting, i.e.,  one where once the idea has been sold the employee cannot leave and implement it on his own.
6 See for example Schipper and Smith (1983), Daley et al. (1997), Desai and Jain (1999), and Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), among others.
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n idea will succeed depends on the managerial ability of the agent who  implements it.7 An employee with ability  succeeds
nd creates the cash ﬂow  ˇ (where  ˇ ∈ {ˇ,ˇ}) with probability .
A new idea may  be a new product, a new production process, or an insight into how to conquer a niche market not served
y the parent ﬁrm; a new idea is an employee-driven innovation in a broad sense. To come up with an idea, an employee
xploits some local knowledge and has better information about the value of the idea than the employer. For simplicity but
ithout loss of generality, it is assumed that the employee perfectly observes the idea’s quality ˇ, while the employer knows
nly the distribution of good and bad ideas. The employee who  is at the origin of an idea is the only one able to implement
t.8
A new idea can be developed in a division of the parent ﬁrm, in a subsidiary of the parent employer (spinoff), or in a
ompletely independent ﬁrm (spin-out) created by the employee. In the model, the funds needed to ﬁnance the project are
ormalized to zero. This is a simplifying assumption, and introducing an implementation cost does not qualitatively affect
he results. If funds are needed and an employee is ﬁnancially constrained, he could have access to a competitive venture
apital market.9
The expected proﬁt of an employee  with an idea  ˇ who  decides to create a new ﬁrm is ˇ,  where  ˇ = {ˇ, ˇ}. If the
ew idea is developed in a division of the ﬁrm or in a spinoff, the parent employer can allocate some additional non-
ontractible resources to it. The parent ﬁrm’s investment (synergy) S affects the returns of a successfully implemented new
dea. The investment has an opportunity cost: C(S) = cS2/2. To rule out pure cost considerations as driving forces of one of
he organizational forms and focus the analysis on the role played by the information asymmetry, it is assumed that for a
iven S the cost is the same independent of the resources being allocated to a division of the ﬁrm or to a spinoff. I refer to
he parent ﬁrm’s investment as a synergy in order to capture the implicitly assumed advantage that the parent ﬁrm has
n investing in the employee’s project, compared to other ﬁrms. This advantage arises because the project is related to the
apability of the parent ﬁrm, or because the employee has acquired some speciﬁc human capital that allows him to better
se the parent ﬁrm’s investment than the help of an alternative investor. Following this interpretation, the cost parameter c
ay be affected by the degree of ﬁt between a new idea and the ﬁrm’s existing activity(ies); namely, a stronger ﬁt between
he parent ﬁrm’s activity and the new idea would imply a lower c.
The expected total surplus from developing an idea with the participation of the parent ﬁrm is ˇ(1 + S) − C(S). The optimal
evel of investment is S = ˇ/c, so developing the idea with the involvement of the parent ﬁrm creates at most ˇ + (ˇ)2/2c.
The difference between the division of the ﬁrm and the spinoff lies in the ability of third parties to assess the project’s
erformance. If a project is developed in a division, then the revenue the project creates is part of the total revenue of
he parent ﬁrm. Isolating and assessing the performance of a speciﬁc division is difﬁcult (costly) for third parties, and the
mployer cannot offer a contract based on the project’s performance. However, if a new idea is developed in a spinoff, since
t is an independent unit, its revenue is easier to assess by third parties, and a performance-based contract can be offered. For
xample, if the principal wants to offer compensation tied to the market performance of the ﬁrm, if a project is developed in a
pinoff, then the market valuation of the spinoff reﬂects the market valuation for the project only. If the idea is implemented
n a division, the market valuation reﬂects the performance of the ﬁrm as a whole.
An employee who implements his idea – internally or in a new venture – is replaced by a new hire in the ﬁrm’s core
ctivity. New hires have an average ability of m,  with  > m. An employee who has been in the ﬁrm has acquired human
apital that outsiders do not have; thus, allocating an employee to the innovative activity has an opportunity cost which
epends on the quality of the available labor m. The outside wage (i.e., if an employee is hired by a different employer) for
ll employees is normalized to zero. Therefore, the outside opportunity of an employee with a good (resp. bad) idea is ˇ
resp. ˇ).
ssumption 1.
(i) b − bm≥ˇ + (ˇ)2/2c
ii) b − bm≥ˇ
The two conditions state (i) that it is always better to keep an agent with a bad idea in the core activity rather than
llocating him to the innovative activity and (ii) that it is always proﬁtable to keep an agent in the core activity rather than
eplacing him with an outsider. The focus of the analysis is on whether or not good ideas will be developed and if yes whether
he implementation will be in relation with the parent employer or in an independent new venture. Relaxing the conditions
f Assumption 1 would extend the analysis to cases where the bad ideas are also worth being developed internally, without
ffecting the results presented in the following sections.
7 The idea that a successful entrepreneur needs to be a good innovator and a good manager is in the spirit of Lazear (2005), who depicts the entrepreneur
s  a Jack of all trades.
8 At early stages of idea implementation, the innovator is critical.
9 I do not need to assume that the employees are ﬁnancially constrained in order to derive the results of the paper.
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The timing of the employment relationship is the following:
- an employee discovers the value of his idea;
- the principal decides the allocation of employees to the core or innovative activity, and offers the corresponding menu of
contracts;
- each employee decides to accept a contract from the menu or to leave the ﬁrm and create a new venture;
- the vacancies in the core activity – due to departures or relocation of employees to the innovative activity – are ﬁlled with
new hires;
- the parent ﬁrm invests in the new activity whenever developed in a division of the ﬁrm or in a spinoff10;
- outcomes are realized, and the contracts are executed.
2.2. The symmetric information case
As a benchmark, let us consider the case of symmetric information, i.e., the employer observes the quality of the employee’s
idea. To prevent an employee with a good (resp. bad) idea from leaving the ﬁrm, the employer offers a ﬁxed wage ˇ (resp.
ˇ). When the quality of the idea is common knowledge, it is in the employer’s interest to offer an upfront ﬁxed wage that
satisﬁes the employee’s participation constraint. Indeed, by doing so the employer becomes residual claimant and invests
the optimal level S = ˇ/c in each innovative project.
Lemma  1.
• If b > b (where b ≡ (ˇ + (ˇ)2/2c)/( − m)), any employee with ability  works in the core activity of the ﬁrm.
• If b ≤ b, an employee  with a good idea develops it in a division of the ﬁrm, and an employee  with a bad idea works in the
core activity.
Since the surplus created by a good idea developed internally is larger than the surplus of a spin-out, if an idea is
implemented, it is in a division of the company. Hereafter, I refer to the case where b > b as being a non-innovative regime,
since good ideas are not valuable enough and the optimal allocation of talent consists of keeping the employees in the
core activity. The case where b ≤ b is an innovative regime. Whether a ﬁrm is in an innovative or non-innovative regime is
determined by the characteristics of the activity and the industry. If the returns to talent in the core activity decrease (due,
for example, to increasing competition or changing customers’ taste), then the ﬁrm is more likely to be in the innovative
regime. Also if the available labor is with high expected ability (i.e., higher m), good ideas are more likely to be implemented.
In what follows, we will see that when the information is asymmetric spin-outs and spinoffs are created in equilibrium.
3. Allocation of employees with asymmetric information
The principal’s decision to allocate an employee to the core or innovative activity or to let the employee implement the
idea in a spin-out will be discussed in two steps. I ﬁrst characterize the optimal implementation of a good idea from the
perspective of the parent employer – in an internal division, in a spinoff, or in a spin-out. Then I discuss the principal’s
decision to retain an employee with a good idea, in the core or innovative activity of the ﬁrm, or let him create a spin-out.
3.1. Optimal implementation of good ideas
Good ideas developed in divisions of the ﬁrm: If the good ideas are developed in divisions of the parent ﬁrm and
since the performance is not ex post veriﬁable, the employer can only offer a lump sum payment to the employees with
good ideas: ˇ. The employer is a residual claimant of the innovative activity; therefore, he chooses the optimal level of
investment S = ˇ/c. To prevent agents with bad ideas from implementing them, the principal must offer ˇ in the core
activity as well, and his expected proﬁt is:(
2
)d = q ˇ + ˇ 
2
2c
+ bm + (1 − q)b − ˇ (1)
Good ideas developed in separate ﬁrms: If a good idea is developed in a spinoff, the principal can offer a contract (˛, w),
where  ˛ is the share of the realized cash ﬂows offered to the employee, and w is the ﬁxed wage paid by the principal.11 The
10 Since S is non-contractible, the principal chooses the value of the investment that maximizes his expected proﬁt at this stage.
11 A negative w would mean that the transfer is from the employee to the principal.
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orm of the contract considered does not affect the qualitative results of the paper as far as I focus on contracts between the
arent ﬁrm and the employee and rule out budget breaking schemes.12
Under Assumption 1, I focus on values of the parameters for which it is always better to allocate employees with bad ideas
o the core activity of the ﬁrm. Therefore, the menu of contracts {(˛, w), w} is such that the good ideas are implemented
hile the agents with bad ideas continue to work in the core activity. A contract (  ˛ = 1, w = 0), corresponds to the case
here the employee is the sole owner of the cash ﬂows generated by the idea, the parent employer does not invest in the
ew venture – the idea is implemented in a spin-out.13
The principal maximizes the total expected proﬁt:
max
˛,w,w,S
spin = q
(
bm + (1 − ˛)ˇ(1 + S) − w − cS
2
2
)
+ (1 − q)(b − w) (2)
ubject to⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
˛ˇ(1 + S) + w≥ˇ IR
w≥ˇ IR
˛ˇ(1 + S) + w≥w IC
w≥˛ˇ(1 + S) + w IC
(1 − ˛)ˇ − cS = 0 ICP
(3)
Equations IR and IR are the participation constraints of an agent with a good idea and a bad idea, respectively. Equations IC
nd IC are the incentive compatibility constraints; they guarantee that an employee with a good idea chooses to implement
t (IC), while an employee with a bad idea continues to work in the core activity (IC).
The investment S in the innovative activity is not contractible ex ante. Once the contracts have been accepted, the principal
hooses the investment that maximizes the expected proﬁt of the spinoff14: (1 − ˛)ˇ(1 + S) − w − cS2/2, and equation ICP
s the principal’s incentive compatibility constraint.15 The resulting optimal menu of contracts is characterized below:
roposition 1. The menu of contracts that maximizes the parent ﬁrm’s proﬁt when good ideas are implemented is:⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
 ˛ = min  {
(1 − q)(  ˇ − ˇ)(c + ˇ)
ˇ(2(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 − q) + qˇ)
,
c
ˇ
, 1}
w = (1 − ˛)ˇ
(
1 − ˛ˇ
c
)
w = w + ˛ˇ
(
1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ
c
)
A contract (  ˛ = 0, w = ˇ) is equivalent to developing an employee’s good idea in a division of the company. In our
etting, such a contract is never optimal, because an increase in the performance-based reward in the innovative activity
akes it less attractive for an employee with a bad idea and allows the principal to offer a lower wage in order to keep such
n employee in the core activity. Spinning off the innovative activity increases the expected proﬁts of the whole, parent ﬁrm
lus subsidiary. Thus, the paper offers a new mechanism through which spinning off an activity may  increase the value of
he ﬁrm.16 Developing good ideas in spinoffs, rather than internal divisions, allows the parent ﬁrm to reduce the information
ent of the employees with bad ideas, and improves the allocation of resources.17
The result that the spinoff is always the preferred way  of implementing good ideas, when the parent ﬁrm is involved, is
elated to the assumption that the investment cost is the same for a division and for a subsidiary. In some cases, redeploying
esources within the ﬁrm may  come at a lower cost than doing it for a spinoff. For sufﬁcient levels of cost differential, the
nternal division would become the best option for implementing good ideas and therefore the one adopted by the ﬁrm.
I consider two subcases based on the cost of the principal’s investment. If the cost is sufﬁciently low (c < ˇ), then the
rincipal has the possibility of separating the employees with good ideas from those with bad ideas at no cost, i.e., without
12 I rule out budget-breaking schemes in which a third party pays a bonus to the employee and the parent ﬁrm if the project attains a certain level of
utcome, and is compensated by an initial transfer from the employee and the parent ﬁrm. A well-known problem with these schemes is that they are not
obust to collusion (see, for example, Eswaran and Kotwal, 1984). A detailed discussion of this point is provided in Appendix A.1.
13 In this case, the parent ﬁrm does not invest in the new venture and does not get anything from the realized outcome.
14 This is equivalent to saying that the principal maximizes, ex post his total expected proﬁt. Indeed, at the stage the principal chooses S the contracts
ave  been accepted, the choice of S affects the total proﬁt only by affecting the proﬁt of the spinoff.
15 Notice that for  ˛ > 0 the investment of the parent ﬁrm is always lower than the ﬁrst best investment. Indeed, whenever the idea is not implemented in
 division of the ﬁrm, the parent employer is not a residual claimant of the outcome generated by the idea.
16 See Section 1 for a discussion of the relevant empirical and theoretical literature.
17 Ahn and Denis (2004) show that spinoffs allow to increase investment efﬁciency of the pair parent ﬁrm plus spinoff and that this increased efﬁciency
t  least partially explains the increase in ﬁrm value observed at the spinoff announcement.
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paying an information rent to the employees with bad ideas in order to guarantee that they continue to work in the core
activity. However, a high level of  ˛ decreases the principal’s payoff if the idea is good in two  ways: the principal gets a lower
share of the outcome and invests less, which decreases the cash ﬂow realized in the case of success. Therefore, the parent
employer offers the share  ˛ = c/ˇ only if the probability that an idea will be good is sufﬁciently low. Otherwise, he will
decrease the share offered to the employees with good ideas and offer a rent to the employees who are allocated to the core
activity. The principal chooses  ˛ by trading off these two effects: on one hand a higher share decreases the informational
rent of the employees with bad ideas, but on the other hand it reduces the principal’s incentives to invest in the spinoff
thus decreasing the expected proﬁt of the latter. When the fraction of good ideas is higher (i.e., q is higher), it becomes more
valuable to guarantee strong incentives to the principal and decrease ˛.18
If the synergy cost is high (c > ˇ), then implementing good ideas in spinoffs always requires an increase in the wages
in the core activity above ˇ. In this case, it may  be in the principal’s interest to let employees with good ideas leave the
company and create spin-outs.
Proposition 2. If q < q˜,  where q˜ ≡ ((  ˇ − ˇ)(c − ˇ))/((  ˇ − ˇ)(c − ˇ) + ˇ2), then from the parent ﬁrm’s perspective it is
optimal to develop a good idea in a spin-out.
When deciding whether a good idea should be implemented in a spinoff or in a spin-out, the principal trades off the net
expected beneﬁt of developing a good idea in a spinoff with an increased reward for the agents with bad ideas. If the fraction
of good ideas is low, the cost exceeds the beneﬁt and the parent ﬁrm is better off if the employees with good ideas leave. As
a result, spin-outs are more likely in environments where the probability for an employee to have a good idea is low. This
probability may  depend on the employee’s characteristics, on the organizational and managerial choices of the employer,
and on the characteristics of the activity. It can also be endogenous and depend on the employees’ incentives to innovate,
as will be discussed in Section 5.
The impact of the level of returns in the core activity (b) and the employee’s talent () on the likelihood of creating a
spin-out is formally characterized in Propositions 4 and 5, and the corresponding discussion.
3.2. Allocation of talent
If an employee is allocated to the core activity, the quality of his idea is irrelevant for his performance. To keep an
employee with a good idea in the core activity, the principal can only offer a ﬁxed wage that matches the employee’s outside
opportunity: ˇ. Since the employer does not observe the quality of the employee’s idea, the employer cannot prevent an
agent with a bad idea (ˇ) from claiming that the idea is good (ˇ). Whenever the principal wants to keep employees with
good projects in the core activity, it is impossible to separate agents with good and bad ideas, and the principal offers a
unique wage ˇ to all employees. The resulting expected proﬁt is:
c = b − ˇ (4)
When deciding whether to allocate good employees to the core or innovative activity, the principal compares the proﬁt
from Eq. (4) to his optimal expected proﬁt from the innovative activity:
spin = q(bm + (1 − ˛)ˇ
(
1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ
2c
)
− w) + (1 − q)(b − w), (5)
where (˛, w) and w are as deﬁned in Proposition 1. This leads to the following results.
Proposition 3.
(i) For c > ˇ and q < q˜
(1) If b < bˆ,  where bˆ = (ˇ + (  ˇ − ˇ)/q)/( − m),  then the good ideas are developed in spin-outs, and the employees with
bad ideas work in the core activity of the ﬁrm.
(2) If b≥bˆ, then all employees work in the core activity of the ﬁrm.
(ii) For c > ˇ and q≥q˜, and for c < ˇ
(1) If b < b˜,  then the good ideas are developed in spinoffs, and the employees with bad ideas work in the core activity of theﬁrm.
(2) If b≥b˜, then all employees work in the core activity of the ﬁrm, where b˜ ≡ (ˇ + (1 − ˛2)(ˇ)2/2c + ((1 − q)/q)˛(  ˇ −
ˇ
-
)(1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ/c))/( − m).
18 When designing the contract offered to employees who  develop their ideas in spinoffs, the principal’s trade-off is between the incentives of an employee
with  a bad idea to choose the core activity and the incentives of the principal to invest in the new idea. Indeed, the performance related part of an employee’s
payoff should be sufﬁciently high to make the innovative activity less attractive for an employee with a bad idea, but not too high in order not to destroy
the  principal’s incentives to invest. My intuition is that this trade-off should be present for any contract that needs to satisfy the budget constraint xe(ˇ,
S)  + xp(ˇ, S) = ˇ(1 + S). Therefore, allowing for more general contracts should not affect the qualitative results of the paper.
R. Nikolowa / Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 98 (2014) 70– 88 77
i
m
i
c
i
3
t
P
i
i
l
H
s
a
p
a
t
I
o
i
a
l
o
P
a
d
fFig. 1. The optimal allocation of employees with good ideas
The results of Proposition 3 are summarized in Fig. 1.
When the information about the quality of an idea is symmetric, the decision to allocate an employee to the core or
nnovative activity does not affect the wage bill of the parent employer. Therefore, the principal’s decision trades off the
arginal beneﬁts of an employee’s talent in each of the two activities. When information is asymmetric, whether the good
deas are implemented or not affects the wage cost of the parent employer. Indeed, keeping employees with good ideas in the
ore activity leads to higher information rent for the employees with bad ideas, compared to the case where good ideas are
mplemented in spinoffs or spin-outs. This leads to excessive innovation in the equilibrium with asymmetric information.
.3. Firm’s performance, employee’s talent, spin-out creation, and survival
In what follows, I analyze the impact of the returns to talent in the core activity and the employee’s managerial talent on
he likelihood of spin-out creation. Each theoretical result is discussed in light of the existing empirical evidence.
roposition 4. The threshold bˆ below which the employees with good ideas leave the ﬁrm decreases with the probability for an
dea to be good ∂bˆ
∂q
≤ 0.
From Proposition 4 and Fig. 1, we notice that for very high returns in the core activity, the beneﬁt of keeping an employee
s sufﬁciently high and spin-outs are less likely. Therefore, ﬁrms that perform better in their core activity have a lower
ikelihood of creating spin-outs. As the returns in the core activity decrease, the likelihood of spin-out creation increases.
owever as the returns in the core activity decrease further, it becomes more likely that a new idea will be developed in a
pinoff rather than in a spin-out.
In recent empirical studies about spin-outs and spinoffs, particular attention has been devoted to tracing the new ventures
nd their parents, in order to analyze the rate at which ﬁrms spawn new ventures in the same industry and how the
erformance of the spawned units relates to the performance of the parent ﬁrm.
On the ﬁrst point, papers applied to the automobile (Klepper, 2007), disk-drive (Agarwal et al., 2004), and laser (Klepper
nd Sleeper, 2005) industries show that better-performing ﬁrms are more likely to spawn spin-outs. This paper offers a
heoretical rationale for the link between the performance of the parent ﬁrm and the likelihood of a spin-out being created.
 show that the link is not monotone and depends on whether good ideas are valuable enough compared to the core activity
f the ﬁrm. However, this does not contradict the empirical evidence. Klepper and Sleeper (2005) show that in the laser
ndustry spawning of new ventures is most likely when ﬁrms reach middle age; i.e.,  the spawning likelihood ﬁrst increases
nd then decreases over the ﬁrm’s life-cycle. If we  consider that the rents of the ﬁrm in its core activity decrease over its
ife-cycle then the theoretical result of the model is consistent with this empirical ﬁnding.
The likelihood of an idea being implemented with the parent ﬁrm or in a spin-out also depends on the managerial talent
f the employee who has come up with the idea.
roposition 5. When the managerial talent of an employee increases, spin-outs become less likely.An employee with higher managerial talent is more likely to be retained in the core activity of the parent ﬁrm or in
 spin-off. Thus, the spin-outs implement good ideas by founders whose ability is lower than the ability of those who
evelop ideas in the parent ﬁrm’s subsidiaries. At the implementation stage, as has been discussed, the founder is critical
or the implementation of the idea. If we were to consider the evolution of the new venture, however, there is room for
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improvement in terms of managerial talent. The implication of Proposition 5, in that case, is that spinoffs should experience
a lower managerial turnover compared to spin-outs.
Finally, even though the present paper does not explicitly model a knowledge transmission mechanism from the parent
ﬁrm to its employees, the impact of such mechanisms on some parameters could be discussed. First, the quality distribution
of the employees’ ideas can be affected by the technological know-how of the parent ﬁrm. Employees working for a ﬁrm with
strong technological know-how might be more likely to come up with a ‘good’ idea (i.e., in such ﬁrms q would be higher).
Second, as mentioned in the presentation of the model, the employee’s managerial talent at least partially results from
acquiring ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. Employees acquire a higher ability to manage ideas in ﬁrms with stronger market
know-how.19 The theoretical prediction of this reinterpretation would be that ﬁrms where both talents are high (i.e., both
 and q are high) are less likely to spawn new ventures than those where one of the talents is high and the other low.
This is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding of Agarwal et al. (2004), who  analyze the impact of technological and market
pioneering know-how on a ﬁrm’s likelihood of spin-out creation. They ﬁnd that in the disc drive industry, ﬁrms that are
strong in both types of know-how generate fewer external ventures than those that are strong only in one of them.
By combining the results of Propositions 4 and 5, we  can predict how the performance of the parent ﬁrm will affect the
talent characteristics of the employees who create spin-outs.
Proposition 6. The threshold of talent below which employees with good ideas leave the ﬁrm decreases with b.
A decrease of b increases the fraction of spin-outs and the average ability of the employees who leave the ﬁrm. This would
imply that a higher turn-over of managers should be observed in the spin-outs of companies that are performing better in
their core activity.
4. More than two  types
In this section, I consider that ideas can be of three types:  ˇ ∈ {ˇ, ˆˇ ,  ˇ}, where  ˇ > ˆˇ > ˇ. As before, the employee knows
the quality of his idea, and the employer knows only the distribution: q, qˆ,  q are the probabilities for an idea to be ˇ, ˆˇ ,  ˇ,
respectively. Assumption 1 continues to hold. Thus, it is potentially worth implementing only ideas with  ˇ ∈ { ˆˇ , ˇ}.
The key trade-offs continue to hold in this setting. However, extending the analysis to three types of ideas allows me
to discuss how the quality of the idea implemented in spin-outs depends on the degree of ﬁt of the idea with the parent
employer’s activity. Hence, the focus of my  discussion is on the cases where ideas are developed in spin-outs.20
If the cost of the synergy is very low (c < ˆˇ), then the parent employer has the possibility to retain employees with
ideas ˆˇ  and  ˇ without increasing the wage offered in the core activity above ˇ. In this case, all innovation is happening in
spin-offs.
Proposition 7. For intermediate costs of the synergy c ∈ ( ˆˇ, ˇ), if both q and qˆ are sufﬁciently low: the ideas  ˇ are implemented
in spinoffs, the ideas ˆˇ  are implemented in spin-outs, and the employees with ideas  ˇ continue to work in the core activity of the
ﬁrm.
By offering a contract (  ˛ = c/ˇ, w = 0), the principal can separate the employees with ideas  ˇ from those with ideas
 ˇ and ˆˇ at  no cost. However, it is in the principal’s interest to offer such a contract only if the fraction of good ideas is
sufﬁciently low. Indeed, the advantage of such strong incentives is the absence of rent extraction by the employees with less
good ideas. The cost is the reduced incentives for the principal to invest in the innovative activity. Therefore, the principal
is willing to offer this contract only if q is sufﬁciently low. In this case, the decision to retain the employees with ideas ˆˇ
responds to the following trade-off: keeping these employees increases the expected outcome from developing the ideas,
but at the other hand, it increases the wage cost of employees with bad ideas who  continue to work in the core activity. If qˆ
is sufﬁciently low, then the cost exceeds the beneﬁt, and the ideas ˆˇ are developed in spin-outs.
For the intermediate costs of the synergy, if one observes innovation in spin-outs and in spinoffs, the quality of the ideas
implemented in spinoffs exceeds the quality of the ideas developed in spin-outs.
Proposition 8. For high costs of the synergy (c > ˇ):
(i) If both qˆ and q are sufﬁciently low, then the ideas ˆˇ  and  ˇ are developed in spin-outs, and the employees with ideas  ˇ work
in the core activity.
(ii) If only q is sufﬁciently low, then the ideas  ˇ are developed in spin-outs, the ideas ˆˇ  are implemented in spin-offs, and the
employees with ideas  ˇ work in the core activity.For high costs of the synergy, keeping the employees with ideas  ˇ also comes at a cost. Therefore, the principal has to
decide whether to let those employees leave the company or not.
19 In Franco and Filson (2006), the employee learns the employer’s know-how with some probability.
20 The formal analysis is in Appendix A.6.
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If the investment cost is related to the degree of ﬁt between the new ideas and the activity of the ﬁrm, i.e., a stronger ﬁt
orresponds to lower investment cost, from Propositions 7 and 8, it follows that as the degree of ﬁt decreases the quality of
he ideas developed in spin-outs increases.21
. Incentives to innovate
The focus of the paper thus far has been on the development of employee-driven innovative ideas related to the employer’s
apability. Understanding how new ideas are developed is an important stage of the innovation process and has direct
mplications for the agents’ incentives to innovate.
The type of innovations considered are employee or agent driven, and the discussion is about the employee’s incentives to
nnovate and not about the ﬁrm’s (or venture capitalist’s) incentives to ﬁnance early stages of the R&D process. The difference
etween an insider (employee) and an outsider (agent) is the following: an employee by working for the ﬁrm is exposed
o internal information, knowledge, technology; therefore, his idea (if any) would have a stronger ﬁt with the parent ﬁrm’s
apability. However, there is no ﬁt between the outsiders’ ideas and the ﬁrm’s activity; therefore, outsiders’ ideas can be
mplemented only independently from the ﬁrm. In what follows, we will see whether more innovative effort will be carried
n internally or outside the ﬁrm, and whether the internal and external innovations differ due to the potential differences
f incentives to innovate.
Let us consider that an agent or an employee faces an opportunity that he can decide to explore by spending a non-
ontractible effort with a cost I. If the exploration takes place (i.e., the effort is spent), he comes up with a new idea that can
e good (ˇ) with probability q or bad (ˇ) with probability 1 − q. After the exploration phase, he is the only one who  knows
he exact quality of the idea (  ˇ or ˇ). The employee and the agent have the same managerial talent . It is also assumed that
t is not worth investing in the innovative activity if one is sure to come up with a bad idea.
ssumption 2. ˇ < I < ˇ
Whether the inventor is an employee or an outsider affects if and how his idea would be implemented and hence his
xpected payoff. An outside agent can implement an idea only on his own.22 Therefore, the agent’s expected payoff if the
dea is good is ˇ, and if it is bad, the payoff is ˇ. An agent outside the ﬁrm invests in an exploratory activity only if the
robability of coming up with a good idea is sufﬁciently high:
(qˇ + (1 − q)ˇ)≥I ⇒ q≥ 1
(  ˇ − ˇ)
(I − ˇ) (6)
Let us now consider an employee’s incentives to innovate. For the parent employer, it is impossible to commit before the
nnovation stage on future payoffs. This implies that the decisions made at the implementation stage should maximize the
arent employer’s expected proﬁt at that point in time. Therefore, the parent ﬁrm’s decisions and the expected payoffs of an
mployee who has an idea are as described in Section 3. If an employee’s idea is good, his payoff is ˇ. The expected payoff
hen the idea is bad depends on whether good ideas are implemented and how. If the good ideas are not implemented,
.e., all employees are retained in the core activity of the ﬁrm, then the payoff of an employee with a bad idea is ˇ. If the
ood ideas are implemented in spinoffs, an employee with a bad idea is offered w = ˇ − ˛(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ/c)≥ˇ. If
mployees with good ideas leave the company to create spin-outs, an employee with a bad idea receives ˇ.
To give the intuition for the following proposition, let us consider that the parameters satisfy the conditions under which
ood ideas are implemented in spinoffs.23 In this case, an employee explores an opportunity if:
(qˇ + (1 − q)w)≥I ⇒ q≥ I − w
ˇ − w
(7)
or w≥ˇ, the following inequality holds (I − w)/(ˇ − w) ≤ (I − ˇ)/(ˇ − ˇ).
roposition 9. The threshold value for q above which ideas are explored by an employee is lower than or equal to that threshold
or an outsider.For all values of the parameters for which the allocation of employees with good ideas, to the core or innovative activity,
ncreases the reward of the employees with bad ideas above ˇ, there is a distortion in the employees’ incentives to innovate.
21 Increasing the number of types adds signiﬁcant complexity to the analysis. However, my intuition is that the results found in this section should be
xtendable to a setting with more than three types. Indeed, employees with ideas  ˇ > ˆˇ , where ˆˇ = c, can be retained without distorting the incentives
f  the employees with lower types, therefore these ideas should always be developed in spinoffs. Developing the ideas  ˇ < ˆˇ  in spinoffs would distort the
ncentives of those who are more valuable when retained in the core activity. The decision to develop the ideas in spinoffs or in spin-outs should respond
o  the previous trade-off: keeping these employees would increase the expected outcome from developing their ideas, but at the other hand it would also
ncrease the wage cost of the employees who are retained in the core activity of the ﬁrm.
22 If implementation funds were required, he would raise them from a venture capital ﬁrm.
23 The formal discussion and the proof of Proposition 9 are in Appendix A.7.
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The ﬁrm offers an environment with stronger incentives to explore because the rewards if the idea is not good are higher.
Thus, within the ﬁrm, opportunities with a lower probability of turning into good ideas are explored.
Another implication of the endogeneization of the innovation process is that spin-outs are more likely to occur when
the exploration cost is low. Otherwise, only opportunities that will be developed in internal divisions or spinoffs will be
considered.
Under the present speciﬁcation of the innovative process, there is excessive exploration within the ﬁrm. However, the
result that employees exert too much effort is not robust to the way  exploration is modeled. Under a different speciﬁcation,
we may  observe too little innovative effort within the ﬁrm, as shown in Appendix A.8. However, the result that is robust
to the way the innovation process is modeled and therefore is the one that should be emphasized is that the pool of ideas
explored internally is different from the pool of ideas explored by outsiders. Indeed, the average quality of ideas explored
internally is lower than the average quality of ideas explored outside the ﬁrm.
6. Conclusion
This paper proposed a theoretical explanation for two  related questions, what drives inefﬁcient spin-outs and what
trade-offs a ﬁrm faces when it decides to develop an activity in an internal division or in a spinoff. The paper showed that
the performance of the ﬁrm in its core activity affects the likelihood of spin-out creation and the performance of spin-outs
and spinoffs. Then the innovation stage has been analyzed, and we  saw that more risky ideas are more likely to be explored
internally than outside the ﬁrm.
The paper focused on two stages of the innovation process: the agent’s decision to explore or not a new opportunity
and the implementation decision by the parent ﬁrm or an outside investor. An additional step of the analysis would be to
consider an endogenous interaction between the ﬁrm’s core activity and the implemented new ideas. This could provide
insights into intra-industry dynamics and the product’s life-cycle.
Another aspect that has been left aside and that in my  view would represent an interesting direction for further thoughts
is the eventual need for ﬁnancing at the exploration stage and the consequences it would have on the characteristics of the
portfolios of ideas ﬁnanced by venture capitalists and by corporations.
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Appendix A.
A.1. Discussion of the generality of the contracts
In order to reduce the information rent captured by the employees with bad ideas, the principal needs to increase the
performance-based reward of the employees with good ideas. However, under the assumption that the budget is balanced
(i.e., the cash ﬂow y is shared between the principal and the employee) this implies that the performance-based reward
offered to the principal is lower and therefore his incentives to invest into the project are lower.
This trade-off is not affected by the speciﬁcs of the contract under the balanced budget assumption. If I assume that there
is a budget breaker, then he could offer a contract that offers a bonus to the employee and to the parent ﬁrm only if a speciﬁc
level of outcome is attained (i.e., if the outcome is y = ˇ(1 + ˇ/c)). The employee and the parent ﬁrm will need to make
upfront payments to the third party in order to ensure that the the budger breaker’s participation constraint is satisﬁed. An
unappealing property of this types of contracts is that the budget breaker is worst off when the outcome is higher, indeed
if the threshold y is not attained then the third party does not need to pay the bonuses. This property creates room for
collusion between the third party and one of the contractors. A detailed discussion of the problem can be found in Eswaran
and Kotwal (1984).
A.2. Proof of Lemma  1By assumption it is optimal to always allocate the agents with bad ideas to the core activity of the ﬁrm. The expected
proﬁt from allocating an employee with a good idea to the core activity is: c = b − ˇ, the expected proﬁt if the employee’s
idea is developed in a division of the ﬁrm is: d = ˇ + ˇ22/2c − ˇ + bm.  The threshold value b is given by c = d.
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.3. Proof of Propositions 1 and 2
When the good ideas are developed in a spinoff the parent ﬁrm maximizes its expected proﬁt:
max
˛,w,w,S
spin = q
(
bm + (1 − ˛)ˇ(1 + S) − w − cS
2
2
)
+ (1 − q)(b − w) (8)
ubject to⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
˛ˇ(1 + S) + w≥ˇ IR
w≥ˇ IR
˛ˇ(1 + S) + w≥w IC
w≥˛ˇ(1 + S) + w IC
(1 − ˛)ˇ − cS = 0 ICP
(9)
S is given by the principal’s incentive compatibility constraint (ICP):
S = (1 − ˛)ˇ
c
(10)
A higher w decreases the proﬁt and makes the IC constraint more difﬁcult to satisfy. The principal chooses the lowest
ossible w, satisfying both IR and IC, hence w = max{ˇ, ˛ˇ(1 + S) + w}, where S = (1 − ˛)ˇ/c.
IC can be rewritten as:
˛ˇ(1 + S) + w≥ max{ˇ, ˛ˇ(1 + S) + w} (11)
If IR holds, then the inequality above is always satisﬁed and IC is never binding.
A higher w decreases the proﬁt and makes the IC constraint more difﬁcult to satisfy. Therefore the principal chooses
he lowest possible w, satisfying IR. The individual rationality constraint of the high type (IR) is always binding and w =
 − ˛ˇ(1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ/c), this can be rewritten as follows: w = ˇ(1 − ˛)(1 − ˛ˇ/c).
The simpliﬁed program, after replacing for S and w, writes:
max
˛,w
spin = q
(
bm + (1 − ˛2)ˇ
2
2
2c
)
+ (1 − q)(b − w) (12)
ubject to⎧⎨
⎩
−w + ˇ ≤ 0 (IR) 
−w + ˇ − ˛(  ˇ − ˇ)
(
1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ
c
)
≤ 0 (IC)  (13)
 and  are the multipliers of the individual rationality and incentive compatibility constraints of , respectively.
L = q
(
bm + (1 − ˛2)ˇ
2
2
2c
)
+ (1 − q)(b − w) − (−w + ˇ) − 
(
−w + ˇ − ˛(  ˇ − ˇ)
(
1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ
c
))
(14)
The solution needs to satisfy the following conditions:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂L
∂w
= −(1 − q) +  +  = 0
∂L
∂˛
= −q˛ˇ
2

2
c
+ (  ˇ − ˇ)
(
1 + (1 − 2˛)ˇ
c
)
= 0
∂L
∂
= w − ˇ≥0
∂L
∂
= w − ˇ + ˛(  ˇ − ˇ)
(
1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ
c
)
≥0
(15)
Case 1:  = 0 and  = 0, this corresponds to a case where both constraints are slack and it is immediate to see that this is
not a solution.
Case 2:  > 0 and  = 0, this corresponds to a case where the binding constraint is IR. In this case it is in the principal’s
interest to set  ˛ = 0 which in turn violates the IC constraint. Therefore this cannot be a solution.
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• Case 3:  = 0 and  > 0. (15) becomes:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂L
∂w
= −(1 − q) +  = 0
∂L
∂˛
= −q˛ˇ
2

2
c
+ (  ˇ − ˇ)
(
1 + (1 − 2˛)ˇ
c
)
= 0
w − ˇ≥0
w = ˇ − ˛(  ˇ − ˇ)
(
1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ
c
)
(16)
From the ﬁrst equation  = 1 − q. After replacing  = 1 − q in the second equation, I obtain ˛:
−q˛ˇ
2

2
c
+ (1 − q)(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 + (1 − 2˛)ˇ
c
)  = 0 ⇔  ˛ =
(1 − q)(  ˇ − ˇ)(c + ˇ)
ˇ(q  ˇ + 2(1 − q)(  ˇ − ˇ))
(17)
w = ˇ − ˛(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 + (1−˛)ˇc ), satisﬁes the condition w≥ˇ if the following condition holds:  ˛ ≤ min{1, cˇ }.
24
If c > ˇ, then  ˛ = (1−q)(ˇ−ˇ)(c+ˇ)
ˇ(qˇ+2(1−q)(ˇ−ˇ))
, only if
(1−q)(ˇ−ˇ)(c+ˇ)
ˇ(qˇ+2(1−q)(ˇ−ˇ))
< 1, which gives us the following condition:
q≥ (ˇ−ˇ)(c−ˇ)
ˇ
2
+(ˇ−ˇ)(c−ˇ)
.
If c < ˇ, then  ˛ = (1−q)(ˇ−ˇ)(c+ˇ)
ˇ(qˇ+2(1−q)(ˇ−ˇ))
, only if
(1−q)(ˇ−ˇ)(c+ˇ)
ˇ(qˇ+2(1−q)(ˇ−ˇ))
< c
ˇ
, which implies that the following condition needs to
hold: q≥ (ˇ−ˇ)(ˇ−c)
ˇc+(ˇ−ˇ)(ˇ−c)
• Case 4:  > 0 and  > 0. (15) becomes:
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂L
∂w
= −(1 − q) +  +  = 0
∂L
∂˛
= −q˛ˇ
2

2
c
+ (  ˇ − ˇ)
(
1 + (1 − 2˛)ˇ
c
)
= 0
w = ˇ
w = ˇ − ˛(  ˇ − ˇ)
(
1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ
c
)
(18)
From the last two equations, we obtain that  ˛ = 1 or  ˛ = c
ˇ
.
Subcase  ˛ = 1.
 = qˇ
2

(ˇ−ˇ)(c−ˇ)
. Therefore,  > 0 only if c > ˇ.
 = 1 − q − qˇ
2

(ˇ−ˇ)(c−ˇ)
.  > 0 only if q <
(ˇ−ˇ)(c−ˇ)
(ˇ−ˇ)(c−ˇ)+ˇ2
.
Subcase  ˛ = c
ˇ
.
 = qˇc
(ˇ−ˇ)(ˇ−c)
. Therefore,  > 0 only if ˇ > c.
 = 1 − q − qˇc
(ˇ−ˇ)(ˇ−c)
.  > 0 only if q <
(ˇ−ˇ)(ˇ−c)
(ˇ−ˇ)(ˇ−c)+ˇc
.To summarize the results, depending on the cost of the principal’s investment and the distribution of ideas.
If c < ˇ
24 Since I am assuming balanced budget  ˛ ∈ [0,  1].
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(i) If q <
(ˇ−c)(ˇ−ˇ)
(ˇ−c)(ˇ−ˇ)+ˇc
then the optimal menu of contracts is: (  ˛ = c
ˇ
, w = 0) and w = ˇ
ii) If q≥ (ˇ−c)(ˇ−ˇ)
(ˇ−c)(ˇ−ˇ)+ˇc
then the optimal menu of contracts is: (  ˛ = (1−q)(ˇ−ˇ)(c+ˇ)
ˇ(2(ˇ−ˇ)(1−q)+qˇ)
, w = ˇ(1 − ˛)(1 − ˛ˇc )) and w = ˇ −
˛(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 + (1−˛)ˇc )
If c≥ˇ
(i) If q <
(c−ˇ)(ˇ−ˇ)
(c−ˇ)(ˇ−ˇ)+ˇ2
then the optimal menu of contracts is: (  ˛ = 1, w = 0) and w = ˇ
ii) If q≥ (c−ˇ)(ˇ−ˇ)
(c−ˇ)(ˇ−ˇ)+ˇ2
then the optimal menu of contracts is: (  ˛ = (1−q)(ˇ−ˇ)(c+ˇ)
ˇ(2(ˇ−ˇ)(1−q)+qˇ)
, w = ˇ(1 − ˛)(1 − ˛ˇc )) and w = ˇ −
˛(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 + (1−˛)ˇc )
.4. Proof of Proposition 3
In order to decide whether to allocate an employee to the core or innovative activity the principal compares the expected
roﬁt when the employee works in the core activity to the expected payoff when the employee works in the innovative
ctivity:
c = b − ˇ (19)
spin = q
(
bm + (1 − ˛
2)ˇ
2
2
2c
)
+ (1 − q)
(
b − ˇ + ˛(  ˇ − ˇ)
(
1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ
c
))
(20)
b˜ is given by c = spin.
We can characterize the value of the threshold depending on the contract offered to the employees with good ideas.
For c < ˇ
If q <
(ˇ−c)(ˇ−ˇ)
(ˇ−c)(ˇ−ˇ)+ˇc
, then the contract offered to employees with good ideas is (  ˛ = c/ˇ, w = 0). In this case b˜ becomes:
(ˇ)
2
/2c + ˇ − c/2  + ((1 − q)/q)(  ˇ − ˇ)
 − m .
If q≥ (ˇ−c)(ˇ−ˇ)
(ˇ−c)(ˇ−ˇ)+ˇc
, then:
b˜ =
ˇ + (1 − ˛2)(ˇ)2/2c + ((1 − q)/q)˛(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ/c)
 − m ,
where
 ˛ =
(1 − q)(  ˇ − ˇ)(c + ˇ)
ˇ(2(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 − q) + qˇ)
.For c≥ˇ
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• If q < (c−ˇ)(ˇ−ˇ)
(c−ˇ)(ˇ−ˇ)+ˇ2
, then the contract offered to the employees with good ideas is (  ˛ = 1, w = 0), i.e.,  good ideas are
developed in spin-outs. In this case b˜ becomes:
ˇ + (  ˇ − ˇ)/q
 − m ≡ bˆ
• If q≥ (c−ˇ)(ˇ−ˇ)
(c−ˇ)(ˇ−ˇ)+ˇ2
, then:
b˜ =
ˇ + (1 − ˛2)(ˇ)2/2c + ((1 − q)/q)  ˛ (  ˇ − ˇ)(1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ/c)
 − m ,
where
 ˛ =
(1 − q)(  ˇ − ˇ)(c + ˇ)
ˇ(2(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 − q) + qˇ)
A.5. Proof of Propositions 4, 5, and 6
Proof of Proposition 4 From bˆ = ˇ+(ˇ−ˇ)/q
−m , it is immediate to see that
∂bˆ
∂q
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 5 In order to prove the proposition we  show that both bˆ and q˜ decrease with .
∂q˜
∂
= −
(  ˇ − ˇ)ˇ2c
((c − ˇ)(  ˇ − ˇ) + ˇ2)
2
< 0 (21)
bˆ can be rewritten:
bˆ =
ˇ + (  ˇ − ˇ)/q
1 − m/ (22)
it follows immediately that ∂bˆ/∂ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6
The values of  for which an employee with a good idea leaves, are given by the following inequality:
qbm + (1 − q)(b − ˇ)≥b − ˇ (23)
This is equivalent to:
qbm≥(qb − q  ˇ −  ˇ + ˇ) (24)
If b ≤  ˇ + ˇ−ˇq , then the above inequality holds for any .
If b >  ˇ + ˇ−ˇq , then the inequality holds if:
 ≤ bm
(qb − q  ˇ −  ˇ + ˇ)
(25)
It is immediate to see that the right hand side of the inequality decreases with b.
A.6. Proofs for  ˇ ∈ {ˇ, ˆˇ ,  ˇ}With three types, the principal maximizes:
max
w,wˆ, ˆ˛ ,w,˛
 = q(b−w)+qˆ
(
bm + ˆˇ(1 − ˆ˛ )
(
1 +
ˆˇ(1− ˆ˛ )
2c
)
− wˆ
)
+q
(
bm+ˇ(1 − ˛)
(
1+ˇ(1 − ˛)
2c
)
−w
)
(26)
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a
(
m
m
b
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ubject to:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
ˇ − w − ˇ˛
(
1 + ˇ(1 − ˛)
c
)
≤ 0 IR (A)
ˆˇ − wˆ − ˆˇ ˆ˛
(
1 +
ˆˇ(1 − ˆ˛ )
c
)
≤ 0 ˆIR (B)
−w + wˆ + ˇ ˆ˛
(
1 +
ˆˇ(1 − ˆ˛ )
c
)
≤ 0 IC1 (C)
−w + w + ˇ˛
(
1 + ˇ(1 − ˛)
c
)
≤ 0 IC2 (D)
−wˆ − ˆˇ ˆ˛
(
1 +
ˆˇ(1 − ˆ˛ )
c
)
+ w + ˆˇ˛
(
1 + ˇ(1 − ˛)
c
)
≤ 0 ˆIC (E)
−w − ˇ˛
(
1 + ˇ(1 − ˛)
c
)
+ wˆ + ˇ ˆ˛
(
1 +
ˆˇ(1 − ˆ˛ )
c
)
≤ 0 IC (F)
−w + ˇ < 0 IR (G)
(27)
The solution of the programme needs to satisfy:
∂L
∂w
= −q + C + D + G = 0
∂L
∂wˆ
= −qˆ − C + E − F + B = 0
∂L
∂w
= −q + A − D − E + F = 0
∂L
∂  ˆ˛
= −qˆ ˆˇ(1 + (1 − ˆ˛ )
ˆˇ
c
)  + B ˆˇ
(
1 + (1 − 2 ˆ˛ )
ˆˇ
c
)
− Cˇ
(
1 + (1 − 2 ˆ˛ )
ˆˇ
c
)
+E ˆˇ
(
1 + (1 − 2 ˆ˛ )
ˆˇ
c
)
− Fˇ
(
1 + (1 − 2 ˆ˛ )
ˆˇ
c
)
= 0
∂L
∂˛
= −qˇ
(
1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ
c
)
+ Aˇ
(
1 + (1 − 2˛)ˇ
c
)
− Dˇ
(
1 + (1 − 2˛)ˇ
c
)
−E ˆˇ
(
1 + (1 − 2˛)ˇ
c
)
+ Fˇ
(
1 + (1 − 2˛)ˇ
c
)
= 0
(28)
nd the constraints in (27).
The letters A, B, C, D, E, F, G correspond to the multipliers for each of the constraints.
If c < ˆˇ. No ideas are developed in spin-outs. Indeed, the principal can always offer ( ˆ˛  = c/ ˆˇ, wˆ  = 0), (  ˛ = c/ˇ, w = 0),
nd w = ˇ. This menu of contracts leaves no rent to the agents with bad ideas and creates some value from the good ideas
 ˇ and ˆˇ ) being developed in a spinoff. Therefore the employees will always be retained. For high values of qˆ and/or q this
ay not be the optimal menu of contracts25. However the optimal contract could only improve things compared to the
enu of contracts described above, so there will be no departures.
If c > ˆˇ. I proceed in two steps.
First, I prove that if  ˛ < min{c/ˇ, 1}, then a contract ( ˆ˛  = 1, wˆ = 0) is not compatible with ˆIC. If ( ˆ˛  = 1, wˆ = 0), then ˆIC
ecomes:
ˆˇ≥w + ˛ ˆˇ
(
1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ
c
)
(29)
The constraint is easiest to satisfy for the lowest possible w, compatible with IR, w = ˇ − ˛ˇ(1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ/c). Therefore
he constraint can be rewritten as follows:
ˆˇ≥ˇ − ˛(  ˇ − ˆˇ )
(
1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ
c
)
⇔ 0≥(  ˇ − ˆˇ )(1 − ˛)
(
1 − ˛ˇ
c
)
(30)
25 The intuition is the same as in the case with two types.
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It is immediate to see that the constraint does not hold if  ˛ < min{c/ˇ, 1}.
It follows that ˆˇ will only be developed in spin-outs if  ˛ = 1 or if  ˛ = c/ˇ.
Second, I now consider the cases where the ideas ˆˇ are developed in spin-outs.
The employees with ideas ˆˇ develop their ideas in spin-outs if the following set of constraints are binding: IR, ˆIR, IC1, ˆIC,
and IR. From ˆIR,  IR, and IC1 holding with equality and c > ˆˇ, it follows that ( ˆ˛  = 1, wˆ = 0). From IR, ˆIR, and ˆIC holding with
equality, it follows that we should be in one of the following cases  ˛ = c/ˇ or  ˛ = 1.
First subcase:  ˛ = c/ˇ, for this we need the following condition to hold c < ˇ. The menu of contracts is: (  ˛ = c/ˇ, w =
0), ( ˆ˛ = 1, wˆ = 0), and w = ˇ. In this case the ideas  ˇ are developed in spinoffs, the ideas ˆˇ are developed in spin-outs,
and the employees with  ˇ are retained in the core activity. In order to be in this case, the multipliers of the corresponding
binding constraints need to be positive, which requires the following conditions to hold:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
qˆ ≤
q( ˆˇ  − ˇ)(c − ˆˇ)
( ˆˇ)
2
q ≤
qˆ(( ˆˇ − ˇ)(c − ˆˇ) + ( ˆˇ)2)
( ˆˇ  − ˇ)(c − ˆˇ)
(  ˇ − ˆˇ )(ˇ − c)
ˇc
(31)
Second subcase:  ˛ = 1, for this we need the following condition to hold c > ˇ. The menu of contracts is: (  ˛ = 1, w = 0),
( ˆ˛  = 1, wˆ = 0), and w = ˇ. In this case both  ˇ and ˆˇ  are developed in spin-outs, the employees with ideas  ˇ continue to
work in the core activity. In order to be in this case, the multipliers of the corresponding binding constraints need to be
positive, which requires the following conditions to hold:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
qˆ ≤
q( ˆˇ  − ˇ)(c − ˆˇ)
( ˆˇ)
2
q ≤
qˆ(( ˆˇ − ˇ)(c − ˆˇ) + ( ˆˇ)2)
( ˆˇ  − ˇ)(c − ˆˇ)
(  ˇ − ˆˇ )(c − ˇ)
(ˇ)
2
(32)
Finally, the last case to consider is: ideas  ˇ are developed in spin-outs, while ˆˇ  are developed in spin-offs. This happens
if the following constraints hold with equality: IR, ˆIR, IC1, and ˆIC. From IR, ˆIR, and ˆIC,  holding with equality it follows that we
are in one of the following sub-cases  ˛ = c/ˇ or  ˛ = 1. The sub-case of interest is  ˛ = 1, which corresponds to c > ˇ. The
menu of contracts offered by the principal is:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(  ˛ = 1, w = 0)
( ˆ˛  =
q( ˆˇ − ˇ)(c + ˆˇ)
ˆˇ(qˆ ˆˇ  + 2q( ˆˇ  − ˇ))
, wˆ = ˆˇ  − ˆ˛ ˆˇ
(
1 + (1 − ˆ˛ )
ˆˇ
c
)
)
w = ˆˇ − ˆ˛ ( ˆˇ − ˇ)
(
1 + (1 − ˆ˛ )
ˆˇ
c
)
The conditions that need to be satisﬁed in order to be in this case are as follows:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
qˆ >
q( ˆˇ − ˇ)(c − ˆˇ)
( ˆˇ)
2
q <
(  ˇ − ˆˇ )(c − ˇ)
(  ˇ − ˆˇ )(c − ˇ) + ˇ2
(33)
Additional conditions would be added when we  consider whether an employee should be allocated to the core or
innovative activity. For low values of b the conditions for spin-out creations are as above.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 9
An agent who innovates outside the ﬁrm will explore any idea for which the following condition holds:
q≥
I − ˇ
(  ˇ − ˇ)
≡ qo (34)An employee with a good idea leaves the ﬁrm and creates a spin-out if:
q < min{
(c − ˇ)(  ˇ − ˇ)
(c − ˇ)(  ˇ − ˇ) + ˇ2
,
(  ˇ − ˇ)
b( − m)  − ˇ }  (35)
•q
t
•
(
t
o
w
t
(
ˇ
b
I
A
t
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If qo < min{ (c−ˇ)(ˇ−ˇ)
(c−ˇ)(ˇ−ˇ)+ˇ2
,
(ˇ−ˇ)
b(−m)−ˇ }
In this case, the expected payoff of an employee from exploring an opportunity that may  be good with probability qo is
oˇ + (1 − qo)ˇ. It is immediate to see that the employee does not have incentives to pass on opportunities with q > qo or
o explore opportunities with q < qo. This implies that the employee’s decision rule is the same as for an outsider.
If qo≥ (c−ˇ)(ˇ−ˇ)
(c−ˇ)(ˇ−ˇ)+ˇ2
, then we shall consider two sub-cases.
i) If
(c−ˇ)(ˇ−ˇ)
(c−ˇ)(ˇ−ˇ)+ˇ2
≤ qo ≤ ˛(ˇ−ˇ)(1+(1−˛)ˇ/c)
b(−m)−(ˇ+(1−˛2)(ˇ)2/2c)+˛(ˇ−ˇ)(1+(1−˛)ˇ/c)
In this case, for q = qo the good ideas are developed in a spinoff, which implies that the menu of contracts offered to
he employees is as characterized in Proposition 1. The expected payoff of an employee who decides to explore a new
pportunity that will turn into a good idea with probability qo is:
qoˇ + (1 − qo)w, (36)
here w = ˇ − ˛(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 + (1−˛)ˇc ) > ˇ. This implies that, qoˇ + (1 − qo)w > I, it follows that the employee has incen-
ives to explore opportunities with q < qo.
The employee explores any idea with q such that:
q≥ max{
(c − ˇ)(  ˇ − ˇ)
(c − ˇ)(  ˇ − ˇ) + ˇ2
,
I  − w
ˇ − w
} (37)
ii) If qo≥ ˛(ˇ−ˇ)(1+(1−˛)ˇ/c)
b(−m)−(ˇ+(1−˛2)(ˇ)2/2c) + ˛(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ/c)
In this case, for q = qo the employees with good ideas are allocated to the core activity, the principal offers the same wage
 to all employees. The expected payoff of an employee who  decides to explore a new opportunity with probability qo to
e good is:
qoˇ + (1 − qo)ˇ = ˇ (38)
t is in an employee’s interest to explore all opportunities with
q≥
˛(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ/c)
b( − m) − (ˇ + (1 − ˛2)(ˇ)2/2c) + ˛(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ/c)
It is in the employee’s interest to explore any idea for which the following inequality applies:
q≥ max  {
(c − ˇ)(  ˇ − ˇ)
(c − ˇ)(  ˇ − ˇ) + ˇ2
, min{ I − w
ˇ − w
,
˛(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 + (1 − ˛)ˇ/c)
b( − m) − (ˇ + (1 − ˛2)(ˇ)2/2c) + ˛(  ˇ − ˇ)(1 + (1−˛)ˇc )
}} (39)
.8. Incentives to come up with a good idea
Let us consider that by choosing the amount of effort e an agent decides to put into an innovative activity he may affect
he probability of his idea being good. I assume that an idea will be good (ˇ) with probability e and bad (ˇ) with probability
 − e. The cost of effort is c(e), with c′(e) > 0, c′′(e) > 0, c′(0) = 0 and c′(1)→ + ∞.  Effort is not contractible.
The incentives of an outsider are given by26:
(  ˇ − ˇ) = c′(e) (40)
The incentives of an employee are given by:
max
e
Rin = eˇ + (1 − e)w − c(e) (41)
26 This is the ﬁrst order condition of an agent who  maximizes max
e
Rout = eˇ + (1 − e)ˇ − c(e)
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The ﬁrst order condition writes:
ˇ − w = c′(e) (42)
Since c′′(e) > 0, in all cases where w > ˇ, it is in the employee’s interest to exert less effort than an outsider.
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